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NOTES
HOW TO EXPLAIN TO YOUR TWINS WHY ONLY
ONE CAN BE AMERICAN: THE RIGHT TO
CITIZENSHIP OF CHILDREN BORN TO SAMESEX COUPLES THROUGH ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Lena K. Bruce*
Sections 301 and 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) govern
birthright citizenship by descent. Per the U.S. Department of State’s (DOS)
interpretation of these sections, to transmit citizenship to a child, the U.S.
citizen-parent must have a biological connection with the child. For couples
who use assisted reproductive technology (ART) to have children, however,
this means that one parent will always be barred from transmitting
citizenship to their own child. This is because in ART families, at least one
parent will always lack the biological connection that the DOS requires to
transmit citizenship pursuant to the INA. This policy disproportionately
affects same-sex couples since same-sex couples who choose not to adopt
rely almost exclusively on ART to have children.
Further, even if the citizen-parent is able to establish a biological
connection, the children of married same-sex couples are categorically
considered born out of wedlock and therefore subjected to significantly
harsher citizenship requirements.
The DOS’s interpretation of the INA raises serious concerns about the
protection of same-sex couples’ constitutional rights. It also prompts policy
questions about the importance of biology versus intent in determining
parentage. This Note argues that the effects of the DOS’s interpretation on
same-sex couples can be counteracted through a dual approach. First,
Congress must amend the INA to recognize intent-based parentage. Second,
until Congress passes such an amendment, federal courts and state
legislators must collaborate to protect the rights of same-sex parents.

* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; LL.B., 2017, Koç University
Law School. I would like to thank Professor Joseph Landau for his interest, Ryan Partelow
and the editors and staff of the Fordham Law Review for their guidance, and my family,
friends, and Ben for their constant encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION
Andrew and Elad met at a holiday party.1 After two years of dating, they
got married.2 After five years of marriage, they decided it was time to grow
their family.3 As a same-sex couple, they turned to assisted reproductive
technology (ART) for help.4
ART is used to have children without relying on the reproductive organs
of the parents.5 It includes all fertility treatments in which eggs or embryos
are handled outside the body to induce pregnancy.6 The two most common
ART procedures are artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization.7 In
artificial insemination, sperm is introduced into the female reproductive
system via injection, while during in vitro fertilization, eggs are surgically
removed, combined with sperm in a laboratory, and returned to the woman’s
uterus.8 ART procedures also often require donated eggs or sperm and a
gestational surrogate.9
ART is shattering traditional conceptions about what a family “should”
look like.10 Through ART, a child can have up to five “parents”: the sperm
donor, the egg donor, the surrogate, and two nonbiologically related
individuals who intend to raise the child.11 Even the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that, today, the “average American family” is difficult to define
since the composition of each family can greatly vary.12

1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11, Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No.
2:18-cv-00523, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30525 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019) [hereinafter DvashBanks Complaint].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
5. JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 1 (2d ed. 2013).
6. Id. at 7.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Assisted Reproductive Technologies, SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD. TECH.,
https://www.sart.org/patients/a-patients-guide-to-assisted-reproductive-technology/generalinformation/assisted-reproductive-technologies/ [https://perma.cc/7HG7-SBSP] (last visited
Nov. 12, 2019). There are two types of surrogacy: traditional surrogates are themselves
artificially inseminated, either by the intended father or an anonymous donor, and carry the
baby to term. Overview of the Surrogacy Process, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/overview-of-the-surrogacy-process [https://perma.cc/VTM4BF7H] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). In comparison, gestational surrogates carry babies that
were conceived by fertilizing the egg of the intended mother (or anonymous donor) with the
sperm of the intended father (or anonymous donor) in a laboratory. Id.
10. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”?: The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 355 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). While the U.S. Supreme Court was
speaking in reference to the role of grandparents in single-parent households, the logic of
Troxel equally applies in the context of ART.
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The use of ART has doubled over the past decade.13 Same-sex couples, in
particular, increasingly rely on ART to have children.14 Andrew and Elad
Dvash-Banks are one of these couples.15 They used ART to source
anonymous donor eggs and fertilize the eggs with their separate sperm.16 The
resulting embryos were then implanted into a gestational surrogate17 and,
finally, in September 2016, Andrew and Elad became proud parents to twin
boys—Aiden and Ethan.18
After the birth of their children, the couple decided to move from Canada,
where the twins were born, to California, to be near Andrew’s family.19 In
doing so, however, the Dvash-Banks family encountered a problem: Aiden
entered the country with his American passport.20 Ethan, his twin, had to
apply for a tourist visa.21
The reason for the different treatment is “the nationality of the sperm” that
was used to conceive each child.22 Andrew is an American citizen while
Elad is Israeli.23 When the couple sought recognition of their twins’ U.S.
citizenship, the U.S. consular official in Toronto asked them to submit a DNA
test to prove that each child was biologically related to the American parent.24
The result showed, however, that Aiden was conceived with Andrew’s sperm
and Ethan with that of Elad.25 Since Ethan is not biologically related to the
American parent, the Department of State (DOS), through the consulate,
denied him citizenship.26
In January 2018, Andrew filed a lawsuit in the Central District of
California, on behalf of himself and Ethan, challenging this decision.27
Among other requests, he asked to be recognized as Ethan’s parent and, as a
result, for Ethan to be declared a U.S. citizen.28
The Dvash-Banks family’s plight exemplifies the bewildering intersection
of ART and citizenship law. “ART children” like Ethan and Aiden almost
always lack a genetic or gestational relationship with at least one of their

13. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html [https://perma.cc/UN2V-RGTP]
(last updated Sept. 10, 2019).
14. Scott Titshaw, A Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens, & etc.:
Immigration Law, the Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 420 (2011).
15. See Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 5, 15.
20. Id. at 15.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 13; Titshaw, supra note 14, at 422.
23. Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 1, 5.
28. Id. at 24.
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intended parents.29 However, per its interpretation of the relevant provisions
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the DOS does not recognize
a parent-child relationship unless there is such a biological30 connection.31
An immediate consequence of this biology-based policy is that the DOS
does not recognize the birthright citizenship of many ART children, like
Ethan.32 The interpretation makes citizenship transmission dramatically
difficult not only by prohibiting “merely” an intended parent from
transmitting citizenship but also by positing that a biological parent-child
connection is only the threshold, not the rule, to transmit citizenship.33 In
other words, even if the parent establishes a biological relationship with the
child, the parent only becomes eligible to transmit citizenship.34 Whether
citizenship is actually transmitted further depends on meeting certain criteria
set out in the INA.35
The INA provides two alternative routes for a parent to transmit
citizenship. INA section 301 outlines the criteria for transmitting citizenship
to children born in wedlock.36 INA section 309 does the same for children
born out of wedlock.37 The criteria under section 309 are significantly harder
to satisfy than those under section 301.38 Yet, in deciding which children are
born in wedlock, biology is once again determinative: per the DOS’s
interpretation of the INA, a child is considered born in wedlock only if his or
her biological parents are married; it is not enough for the intended parents
to be married.39
With one marginal exception applicable to certain lesbian parents,
however, the biological parents of a same-sex couples’ ART child will never
be married.40 This means that the ART children of essentially all same-sex
couples are categorically born out of wedlock, even if their intended parents
are married.41 This is particularly alarming since same-sex couples who
choose not to adopt rely exclusively on ART to have children.42
29. AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION WITH REPORT NO. 113, at 1 (2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/ebook-ofresolutions-with-reports/2017-hod-midyear-electronic-report-book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8AL-B596] [hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION 113].
30. This Note uses the term “biological” to encompass both genetic and gestational
relationships.
31. See infra Part I.B.2.
32. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.B.2.
33. See infra Part I.B.2.
34. See infra Part I.B.2.
35. See infra Parts I.A.1–2.
36. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012).
37. Id. § 1409.
38. See Ashley D. Craythorne, Note, Same-Sex Equality in Immigration Law: The Case
for Birthright Citizenship for Foreign-Born Children of U.S. Citizens in Same-Sex Binational
Unions, 97 TEX. L. REV. 645, 663 (2019). Compare id., with INA § 1401.
39. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
40. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
41. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
42. See Michael J. Higdon, Biological Citizenship and the Children of Same-Sex
Marriage, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 124, 168 (2019). LGBTQ couples in which one partner is
transgender may provide an exception to this statement if the transgender partner retains the
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“Citizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have
rights.”43 The DOS’s denial of this vital right based on a narrow reading of
the INA raises serious concerns.44 First and foremost, the DOS policy’s
effect on same-sex couples prompts questions about the constitutionality of
the practice45 in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions United States v.
Windsor,46 Obergefell v. Hodges,47 and Pavan v. Smith.48 Further, the policy
is controversial for its rigid emphasis on biology-based parentage, which
appears antithetical to the congressionally established purpose of the INA to
protect family unity.49
To provide a tailored analysis of and potential solution to DOS’s
interpretation of the INA, this Note focuses on (1) the birthright citizenship
of (2) ART children (3) who are born abroad (4) to same-sex parents, (5) only
one of whom is a U.S. citizen. Part I provides an overview of birthright
citizenship with a specific focus on the right to citizenship of children born
abroad, as governed by the INA. Part I also details the DOS’s interpretation
of the INA and its effects on same-sex couples’ ability to transmit citizenship
to their ART children. Part II discusses the assorted concerns raised by
DOS’s biology-based interpretation, including questions concerning samesex couples’ constitutional rights. Part III concludes by proposing a dual
approach to counteract the effects of the DOS’s policy on same-sex parents.
The dual approach consists of, first, congressional amendment of the INA
and, second, collaboration between state legislatures and the federal
judiciary.
I. BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP OF CHILDREN BORN ABROAD THROUGH
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
For many, citizenship is an ingredient of identity just as family, language,
and ethnicity are.50 For all, citizenship is a vessel that brings with it a set of
biological traits of the gender with which they do not identify, allowing for traditional
procreation. See, e.g., Jackie Molloy & Denise Grady, A Family in Transition, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/health/transgender-baby.html [https://
perma.cc/4K9L-HJNY] (telling the story of two fathers, one of whom gave birth to their
daughter).
43. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). In Perez, the
Supreme Court held that it was within Congress’s power to strip an American citizen of
citizenship if the citizen acted in certain ways. Id. at 62 (majority opinion). Justices Hugo
Black and William O. Douglas, dissented, arguing that “[t]he power of Congress to withhold
[citizenship], modify it, or cancel it does not exist.” Id. at 84 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Nine
years later, the Court overruled its Perez decision in Afroyim v. Rusk, explicitly stating, “we
agree with the . . . dissent in the Perez case that the Government is without power to rob a
citizen of his citizenship.” 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967). Through this ruling, the Court
emphasized the unassailable value of citizenship. See id.
44. See infra Part II.
45. See infra Part II.A.
46. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
47. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
48. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
49. See infra Part II.B.1.
50. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 1345 (6th ed. 2015).
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incomparable rights.51 The decision to grant or deny citizenship can be life
altering.52 The INA outlines, among many other things, the requirements for
children born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent to obtain birthright citizenship.53
The authority to interpret these provisions of the INA to make a decision
about the “nationality of a person not in the United States” lies with the
DOS.54
Part I.A provides a limited overview of citizenship by discussing the two
kinds of birthright citizenship as they are presented in the Constitution and
the INA. Part I.B discusses the importance of the parent-child relationship
to birthright citizenship as a segue into the DOS’s interpretation of the INA,
which is central to this Note.
A. Birthright Citizenship Under the INA
There are “two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and
naturalization.”55 Or, in other words, citizenship acquired at birth and
citizenship acquired after birth.56 Citizenship acquired at birth (or birthright
citizenship), in turn, is based on one of two principles: jus soli (“right of the
land”) or jus sanguinis (“right of the blood”).57
Jus soli uses a person’s birthplace to determine citizenshipit “confers a
nation’s citizenship on persons born within that nation’s territory.”58 The
United States has adopted the jus soli principle in the Citizenship Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, according to which anyone can become a U.S.
citizen solely by virtue of being born on U.S. soil.59
In contrast, jus sanguinis (also known as “citizenship by descent”)60
prescribes that the parents’ citizenship determines the child’s citizenship,
51. Id.
52. Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV.
629, 631 (2014).
53. INA §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012).
54. Id. § 1104(a); Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) and Surrogacy Abroad, U.S.
DEP’T ST., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/uscitizenship/Assisted-Reproductive-Technology-ART-Surrogacy-Abroad.html
[https://perma.cc/BRN4-6H82] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
55. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898). “Naturalization is the
process by which U.S. citizenship is granted to a foreign citizen or national after he or she
fulfills the requirements established by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).” Citizenship Through Naturalization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenship-through-naturalization
[https://perma.cc/
X8XD-FD7C] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). The effects of naturalization on the citizenship of
ART children is outside the scope of this Note.
56. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 50, at 1263.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also Michael G. McFarland, Note, Derivative Citizenship: Its History,
Constitutional Foundation, and Constitutional Limitations, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
467, 471 (2008) (stating that “any child born within the borders of a state becomes a citizen
of that state”).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (declaring that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside”).
60. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 50, at 1263.
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regardless of where the child is born.61 As such, jus sanguinis governs the
citizenship of children born outside the United States to one or more U.S.
citizens.62 Unlike jus soli, jus sanguinis is not protected by the Constitution63
but is instead under the purview of the INA.64 Since it is based on statute, it
is subject to “congressional design.”65
INA section 301 governs the citizenship by descent of children born in
wedlock,66 while INA section 309 governs the citizenship of children born
out of wedlock.67 The distinction between “in” and “out” of wedlock is
critical because it dramatically affects the ease with which the parent-child
relationship is legally formed; the INA makes it easier for children born in
wedlock to acquire citizenship compared to children born out of wedlock.68
As a result of the different criteria mandated by sections 301 and 309, it is
possible for a child to acquire jus sanguinis citizenship under one section
while being denied it under the other.69 As such, determining whether a child
is born in or out of wedlock is dispositive of whether or not a child can obtain
birthright citizenship.70 This is particularly important to the ART children
of same-sex spouses, like Aiden and Ethan, almost all of whom are
considered born out of wedlock and therefore subject to INA section 309’s
harsher requirements.71
This Note focuses on jus sanguinis to isolate the role parents play in the
acquisition of citizenship and, by extension, to analyze the differing

61. Id.; McFarland, supra note 58, at 471 (explaining that jus sanguinis “passes parental
citizenship automatically to children”).
62. See McFarland, supra note 58, at 468.
63. Id. at 484–85.
64. See INA §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012).
65. McFarland, supra note 58, at 485; see Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998)
(holding that “[p]ersons not born in the United States acquire citizenship by birth only as
provided by Acts of Congress”); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898)
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment “has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by
being born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had
always been, by Congress”).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1401. Initially, section 301 appears to generally govern “[n]ationals and
citizens of the United States at birth.” Id. Even though the statutory language does not
explicitly say so, section 301 is interpreted to regulate only children born in wedlock. Scott
Titshaw, Sorry Ma’am, Your Baby Is an Alien: Outdated Immigration Rules and Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 47, 78 (2010). If section 301’s scope
were not limited in this way, it would also control birth out of wedlock and thereby render
section 309 redundant. See id.
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
68. See Craythorne, supra note 38, at 663. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1401, with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409.
69. See, for example, the case of the Dvash-Banks family where Ethan was denied
citizenship when the DOS applied section 309 but was granted citizenship when the District
Court for the Central District of California applied, upon review, section 301. Compare
Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 3 (denying citizenship under section 309), with
Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 2:18-cv-00523, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30525, at *18, *23 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 21, 2019) (granting citizenship under section 301), appeal docketed, No. 19-55517
(9th Cir. May 6, 2019).
70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
71. See Titshaw, supra note 66, at 105; Craythorne, supra note 38, at 650.
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treatment faced specifically by same-sex parents in attempting to transmit
citizenship to their ART children.
1. Citizenship of Children Born in Wedlock Pursuant to INA Section 301
INA section 301 provides varying sets of requirements for deriving
citizenship from a parent based on three distinct groups of foreign-born
children: those born to (1) two U.S. citizens,72 (2) one U.S. citizen and one
noncitizen U.S. national,73 and (3) one U.S. citizen and one alien.74 The third
permutation is governed by INA section 301(g) and is the focus of this Note.
The heaviest requirements fall on the third group of parents. Under this
category, to convey citizenship, the citizen-parent must have been
“physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions” for at
least five years, “at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen
years.”75 In comparison, under the second group, it is sufficient for the
citizen-parent to have resided in the United States for only one year prior to
the child’s birth.76 Even further, the only requirement under the first group
is for the citizen-parent to have “had a residence” in the United States or one
of its outlying possessions prior to the birth of the child.77
2. Citizenship of Children Born out of Wedlock Pursuant to INA Section
309
Similar to section 301, section 309 sets out varying sets of requirements,
but it does so based on the sex of the citizen-parent.78 If the child is born out
of wedlock to a citizen-father, section 309(a) requires four criteria to be
met.79 If these criteria are met, section 309(a) redirects to section 301, whose
relevant provision (in this case section 301(g), which sets out the physical
presence requirements) must also be satisfied.80 The four criteria are: (1) a
blood relationship between the child and the father must be established by
clear and convincing evidence; (2) the father must be a national of the United
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c).
73. Id. § 1401(d). A noncitizen national is “a person who, though not a citizen of the
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” Id. § 1101(a)(22)(B).
74. Id. § 1401(g). “[A]lien means any person not a citizen or national of the United
States.” Id. § 1101(a)(3).
75. Id. § 1401(g).
76. Id. § 1401(d).
77. Id. § 1401(c).
78. See id. § 1409. An analysis of this sex-based distinction is beyond the scope of this
Note. However, for a reckoning of “the gendered construction of the parent-child relationship
in American nationality law,” see Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis
Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134,
2233 (2014). See also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, in which Justice Ginsburg comments that
“[s]ections 1401 and 1409 . . . date from an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife
with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are” and accordingly rules that
“[t]he gender-based distinction infecting [the relevant sections] . . . violates the equal
protection principle.” 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689, 1700–01 (2017).
79. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
80. See id.
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States at the time of the child’s birth; (3) the father (unless deceased) must
agree, in writing, to provide financial support for the child until the age of
eighteen; and (4) before the child turns eighteen, the child must be
legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, the father must
acknowledge paternity of the child in writing under oath, or the paternity of
the child must be established by the adjudication of a competent court.81
In contrast, if a child is born out of wedlock to a citizen-mother, section
309 is silent regarding any additional requirements that need to be met.82
Instead, under section 309(c), a child born out of wedlock outside the United
States will acquire citizenship from the mother as long as the mother was a
U.S. national at the time of birth and had previously resided in the United
States for a certain amount of time.83 The physical presence requirement is
specified as one year under section 309(c).84 However, pursuant to the recent
Supreme Court decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana,85 the provision, as
written, applies only to children born before June 12, 2017 (the date of the
decision).86 To transmit citizenship to children born abroad out of wedlock
on or after that date, the citizen-mother must have resided in the United States
for five years.87
B. The DOS’s Interpretation of the INA
Despite painstakingly outlining the rules on how to transmit citizenship
from parent to child, the INA is unclear on what actually constitutes a parentchild relationship.88 As such, the question of who can transmit U.S.
citizenship to a child remains open to the DOS’s interpretation.89 The DOS’s
biology-based interpretation of parentage, however, disproportionally affects
the recognition of parent-child relationships between same-sex couples and
their ART children.90
1. The Ambiguity of the Parent-Child Relationship Under the INA
Defining a parent-child relationship is crucial for two reasons. First,
whether, under jus sanguinis, a foreign-born child is eligible to acquire U.S.
citizenship hinges on the existence of a parent-child relationship.91 Second,
identifying who constitutes the parents of the child is necessary to determine

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
See id. § 1409(c).
Id.
Id.
137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
See id. at 1701.
Id.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c); see also Titshaw, supra note 14, at 418–19.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
Titshaw, supra note 66, at 56.
See Titshaw, supra note 14, at 415.
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whether these parents are married and, in turn, whether the child was born in
or out of wedlock.92
The INA does not define what constitutes a parent-child relationship for
purposes of INA subchapter III, which governs citizenship and nationality.93
The labyrinthine manner in which the Act defines and uses other relevant
terms does not clarify the matter: for instance, while the INA defines
“parent” and “child,” erratic definitions of the terms apply to different
sections of the Act.94 The definition of “child” as it applies to subchapter III
is limited because it merely gives an example of who is “included” within
the definition.95 The definition of “parent” as it applies to subchapter III is
“even less helpful”96 since it only concerns the posthumous child of a
deceased parent.97 Further, some provisions that depend most on
establishing a parent-child relationship, including sections 301(g) and 309(a),
do not refer to a “child” at all.98
Lacking guidance from the INA on how to identify a parent-child
relationship, courts are having difficulty determining who should be
considered the parents of a child and whether the parents are married.99 This
problem is becoming even more prominent in the age of ART, since ART
has disproven the traditional assumption that children are born only when
two opposite-sex parents unite “genetics, gestation, and intended
parenthood.”100
2. The DOS’s Interpretation of the INA’s Ambiguity
The ambiguity of the INA in defining “parent-child relationship” opens
the door for statutory interpretation. As the authority that enforces the INA’s
provisions on citizenship transmission for foreign-born children, the DOS
has the prerogative to interpret the Act.101 The DOS, in turn, interprets the
INA’s citizenship transmission provisions in two important ways, both of
which particularly affect same-sex couples.

92. See 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 304.1-2 (2019), https://
fam.state.gov/Fam/FAM.aspx?ID=08FAM [https://perma.cc/SA8D-XSJM] [hereinafter
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL]. Not to mention numerous other reasons the parent-child
relationship is crucial for issues besides citizenship, including: inheritance, social security
benefits, health insurance, and custody. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One
Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L.
REV. 341, 346 (2002).
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c); Titshaw, supra note 14, at 418–19.
94. Section 101(b)(1)–(b)(2) defines “child” and “parent” for purposes of subchapters I
and II, while section 101(c)(1)–(c)(2) provides more meager definitions of “child” and
“parent” for purposes of subchapter III. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)–(2), (c)(1)–(2).
95. See id. § 1101(c); see also Titshaw, supra note 14, at 418.
96. Titshaw, supra note 14, at 418–19.
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(2).
98. See id. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a); see also Titshaw, supra note 66, at 76.
99. See Titshaw, supra note 66, at 69–70.
100. Id. at 63.
101. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

1010

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

a. DOS’s Understanding of Parentage
The Foreign Affairs Manual (the “Manual”) codifies the DOS’s policies
and elaborates on DOS’s position that the existence of a parent-child
relationship is contingent upon the existence of a “blood” (i.e., biological)
relationship.102 The Manual states that
[t]he laws on acquisition of U.S. citizenship through a parent have always
contemplated the existence of a blood relationship between the child and
the parent(s) through whom citizenship is claimed. It is not enough that the
child is presumed to be the issue of the parents’ marriage by the laws of the
jurisdiction where the child was born. Absent a blood relationship between
the child and the parent on whose citizenship the child’s own claim is based,
U.S. citizenship is not acquired.103

According to the DOS, this is true not only under section 309, which
explicitly requires a blood relationship,104 but also under section 301, which
is silent on the issue.105
In other words, for a parent-child relationship to exist, which is the
prerequisite for transmitting citizenship, the DOS requires “an actual
biological relationship to a U.S. citizen parent.”106 So, an individual who
intends to become the parent of a child but does not share a biological
connection with the child does not qualify as a parent under the DOS’s
interpretation of the INA and cannot transmit citizenship.107
This biology-based interpretation particularly implicates same-sex
couples.108 Same-sex couples who choose not to adopt rely on gamete
donations and ART to have children.109 This means that, in same-sex
relationships, at least one intended parent will always lack a biological
connection with the child and, as a result, never be legally recognized as the
parent of the child under the INA.110 If the unrecognized “parent” is the only
one with U.S. citizenship (like Andrew is), the child will be denied U.S.
citizenship for lack of an American parent (like Ethan was).
There is only one narrow exception to this outcome. In 2014, the DOS
implemented a minor modification to its policy and now defines the
biological mother as either the genetic mother or the gestational mother.111
In other words, a child has a biological connection and therefore can establish
102. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 301.4-1(D).
103. Id. § 301.4-1(D)(1)(a).
104. INA § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2012); FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92,
§ 301.4-1(D)(1)(b)(1).
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401; FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 301.4-1(D)(1)(d).
106. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 301.4-1(D)(1)(d).
107. See id.
108. Higdon, supra note 42, at 168–69; Titshaw, supra note 66, at 56.
109. See Higdon, supra note 42, at 168. See also supra note 42 for an exception to this
statement regarding transgender parents.
110. Higdon, supra note 42, at 159.
111. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 301.4-1(D)(1)(c) (stating, “[a] woman
may have a biological relationship with her child through either a genetic parental relationship
or a gestational relationship”); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 50, at 1274.
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a parent-child relationship with both the woman whose eggs were used in
conception and the woman who carried and delivered the baby.112 As such,
if a child is conceived using the eggs of one mother but is carried by the other
mother, both intended parents will be recognized as parents under the INA.113
However, even this exception provides limited solace to same-sex couples,
as the discussion of the Blixt v. United States Department of State114 case in
Part I.B.2.b suggests.
b. DOS’s Understanding of Wedlock
The DOS also holds that for a child to be born in wedlock, and therefore
be subject to INA section 301’s more lenient citizenship requirements, the
child’s biological parents must be married.115 The Manual states, “[t]he term
‘birth in wedlock’ has been consistently interpreted to mean birth during the
Under this
marriage of the biological parents to each other.”116
interpretation, a child conceived using donated sperm or eggs will always be
born out of wedlock, even if the child’s intended parents are married.117
This biology-based interpretation has, again, a disproportionate effect118
on same-sex couples where at least one intended parent always lacks a
biological relationship with the child.119 It follows that, although the
intended parents of an ART child may be married, the biological parents will
never be. As a result, the true consequence of the DOS’s interpretation is
that all ART children of same-sex couples are categorically born out of
wedlock and subject to the stricter citizenship requirements under section
309.120
The narrow 2014 DOS modification that allows both intended lesbian
parents to be considered biological parents is the only exception to this
rule.121 Under the exception, the child of a married lesbian couple is
considered born in wedlock as long as the baby is conceived from the egg of
one mother and carried by the second mother since, in that case, both mothers
are considered the biological parents of the child.122
112. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92 § 301.4-1(D)(1)(c).
113. See id. § 304.3-1(b); see also Sarah Mervosh, Gay U.S. Couple Sues State Dept. for
Denying Their Baby Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
07/23/us/state-department-assisted-reproductive-citizenship.html
[https://perma.cc/SMJ5DC9X] (providing a summary of the DOS’s policy, including the 2014 exception).
114. No. 1:18-cv-00124 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2018).
115. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92 § 304.1-2(c).
116. Id. § 304.1-2(a).
117. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Baby Without a Country: Determining Citizenship for
Assisted Reproduction Children Born Overseas, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 337 (2014).
118. Higdon, supra note 42, at 168–69; Titshaw, supra note 66, at 56.
119. Higdon, supra note 42, at 159.
120. See Titshaw, supra note 66, at 105; Craythorne, supra note 38, at 650.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13.
122. FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 92, § 304.3-1(b) (stating that “[a] child born
abroad to a U.S. citizen gestational mother who is the legal parent of the child at the time of
birth in the location of birth, whose genetic parents are an anonymous sperm donor and the
U.S. citizen wife of the gestational legal mother, is considered for citizenship purposes to be
a person born in wedlock of two U.S. citizens”).
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However, as mentioned previously, this exception protects only a very
small margin of same-sex couples, and not even all lesbian couples as
evidenced by a case that is currently pending before the District Court for the
District of Columbia.123 Allison Blixt, a U.S. citizen, filed the case.124
Allison’s wife, Stefania Zaccari, is an Italian citizen.125 The couple has two
sons, Lucas and Massimiliano (“Massi”), both of whom were born during
Allison’s marriage to Stefania.126 Allison and Stefania each carried a child
who was conceived using their own eggs and sperm from an unknown
donor.127 Allison conceived and carried Massi while Stefania conceived and
carried Lucas.128 Both gave birth in England.129
Through the U.S. embassy in London, the DOS found that both children
were born out of wedlock and applied the stricter provisions of INA section
309.130 The DOS found that, even under its modified interpretation, the
biological parents of the children were not married since, in both pregnancies,
each woman used her own eggs to conceive the child and carried the child.131
This means that each child has only one biological mother.132 The children
could have been born in wedlock only if, for example, Allison carried a child
that was conceived using Stefania’s eggs instead of her own.133
The situation of the Zaccari-Blixt family demonstrates that, while the
modified the DOS interpretation may be a step in the right direction, it is
markedly far from eliminating the prejudicial treatment same-sex ART
families are subjected to under the DOS’s interpretation of the INA.
II. CITIZEN UNLESS BORN TO SAME-SEX PARENTS: PROBLEMS WITH THE
DOS’S INTERPRETATION OF THE INA
Because it disproportionately affects same-sex couples’ right to transmit
citizenship to their ART children, the DOS’s biology-based interpretation of
parentage raises serious concerns about the constitutionally protected rights
of same-sex couples, as recognized in recent Supreme Court decisions. It
also prompts questions about the soundness of relying strictly on biology
instead of intent in determining parentage, which appears to contradict the
purpose of the INA itself.

123. See generally Complaint, Blixt v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:18-cv-00124 (D.D.C. Jan.
22, 2018) [hereinafter Zaccari-Blixt Complaint].
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id. at 11.
126. Id. at 12–13.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 14–15.
131. See id. at 15.
132. See id.
133. See supra text accompanying note 122.
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A. The DOS’s Interpretation and the Constitutional Rights of Same-Sex
Couples
Although it may appear that the DOS’s interpretation of the INA
jeopardizes only the right of ART children to citizenship, this is incorrect.134
The DOS’s interpretation also calls into question the right to transmit
citizenship, which belongs to the parents of ART children.135 Accordingly,
same-sex parents’ constitutional rights are implicated.
In a series of cases that culminated in the legalization of same-sex
marriage, the Supreme Court expanded LGBTQ rights over the span of two
decades.136 In United States v. Windsor,137 the Court struck down section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act138 (DOMA), which, for federal purposes,
restricted marriage to “a legal union between one man and one woman.”139
The petitioners, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, were a same-sex couple
whose marriage was recognized in New York, where they resided.140 When
Spyer died, she left her entire estate to Windsor, who then attempted to claim
the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses.141 Section 3 of
DOMA barred Windsor from benefitting from this exemption and she was
instead subjected to $363,053 in estate taxes.142 The Court struck down
section 3 as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.143
Two years later, in Obergefell v. Hodges,144 the Court expanded Windsor
by striking down state bans on same-sex marriage.145 In Obergefell, the
petitioners consisted of fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose samesex partners were deceased.146 Together, they claimed that the laws of
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by restricting marriage to a union between one man and one
woman.147 They argued that these laws denied them the right to marry or
134. See Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 52, at 706.
135. Id.
136. Prior to these cases, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), which held that laws criminalizing sodomy were constitutional, in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003), which recognized that it is not the job of the state to “define the
meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries.” In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996),
the Court held that an amendment to the Colorado state constitution preventing protected
status based on homosexuality or bisexuality violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
137. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
138. See id. at 2695.
139. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419
(1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
140. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2695.
144. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
145. Id. at 2607 (concluding that “[t]he Constitution . . . does not permit the State to bar
same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite
sex”).
146. Id. at 2593.
147. Id.
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have their marriages, which were lawfully performed in another state, be
fully recognized in their respective states.148 Ultimately, the Court found
that, under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples cannot be denied their
fundamental right to marry.149
In 2017, Pavan v. Smith150 became the first Supreme Court case to address
issues that arose regarding the application and scope of Obergefell. The
petitioners were two married same-sex couples who conceived children
through anonymous sperm donation.151 They sued when the Arkansas
Department of Health refused to include the name of each birth mother’s wife
The petitioners challenged the
on the child’s birth certificate.152
constitutionality of an Arkansas statute that required the name of the mother’s
husband to appear on the birth certificate regardless of his biological
relationship to the child but permitted the omission of the mother’s wife’s
name.153 The Arkansas Supreme Court found that the statute “does not run
afoul of Obergefell ” since it “centers on the relationship of the biological
mother and the biological father to the child, not on the marital relationship
of husband and wife.”154 In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the differential treatment violates Obergefell’s goal of
providing same-sex couples “the constellation of benefits that the States have
linked to marriage.”155
Pavan is important for clarifying that the right of same-sex couples to
marry includes protection from differential treatment in terms of the benefits
associated with marriage. At the same time, Pavan also demonstrates that
the seemingly straightforward application of the universal right to marry is
nevertheless open to a certain degree of interpretation.156 This adds a dose
of unpredictability to the manner in which Windsor and Obergefell apply to
the treatment of same-sex ART parents in the context of citizenship law.
Ultimately, however, there is little doubt that the DOS’s interpretation raises
serious constitutional questions since, by virtue of categorically considering
ART children of married same-sex couples as born out of wedlock, it fails to
give full recognition to same-sex marriages.157
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2604–05.
150. 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
151. Id. at 2077.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015)).
156. See G. M. Filisko, After Obergefell: The Supreme Court Ruling Settled the Issue of
Marriage Equality—While Unsettling Other Legal Matters, A.B.A. J., June 2016, at 56, 58
(sharing a discussion with Douglas NeJaime where NeJaime points out “a lot of states were
going to, of course, allow same-sex couples to get married, but that there would be issues that
would follow from that about what their marriage would mean for other laws”).
157. Importantly, opposite-sex couples may also use ART to conceive children and
confront similar problems. However, that does not change the constitutionally suspect effect
that the DOS’s interpretation has on essentially all same-sex couples, which is the focus of
this Note.
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Pavan supports the constitutionally suspect nature of the DOS’s
interpretation. In Pavan, the Court found that birth certificates “give married
parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried parents”
and that, accordingly, Arkansas may not “deny married same-sex couples
that recognition.”158 Ability to transmit citizenship under section 301 is a
similar “form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried parents”
and the DOS may similarly not “deny married same-sex couples that
recognition.”159
Further, the DOS’s interpretation also disregards the reasoning of the
Court in both Windsor and Obergefell. In both cases, the Court gave great
weight to the harm that children would suffer if the marriage of their samesex parents was either not allowed or not recognized. In Windsor, the Court
found that when same-sex marriage is recognized at the state level but denied
at the federal level, it becomes a “second-tier” marriage that “humiliates tens
of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.”160
Similarly, in Obergefell, the Court partly justified its decision by
emphasizing how, “[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and predictability
marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are
somehow lesser.”161 Notably, two petitioners in Obergefell, April DeBoer
and Jayne Rowse, brought their initial suit because, under Michigan adoption
laws, only one could be recognized as the legal parent of their children.162
The Court acknowledged that not recognizing DeBoer’s and Rowse’s equal
claim to parenthood denied “them the certainty and stability all mothers
desire to protect their children.”163
The Court’s reasoning in both cases is applicable to the predicament of
same-sex parents of ART children. The similarity of DeBoer and Rowse’s
complaint to that of the Dvash-Bankses or Zaccari-Blixts is especially
relevant. By considering the ART children of essentially all same-sex
parents as born out of wedlock and thereby denying them a more lenient path
to citizenship,164 the DOS’s interpretation undermines the importance the
Court places on protecting children.
158. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078–79.
159. Id.; see also Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 9 (similarly arguing that the
“constellation of benefits . . . linked to marriage” includes “legal recognition that same-sex
spouses may both be the parents of a child born during their marriage, even if only one spouse
is the child’s biological parent” (emphasis added)). The DOS is likely to hold that, since it
modified its policy in 2014 to include gestational mothers in its definition of biological
parents, same-sex parents can benefit from section 301. However, as Part I.B.2.b discussed,
this is a very narrow exception that only benefits a small fraction of lesbian parents—making
the modification superficial. In effect, the DOS’s interpretation still causes categorically
differential treatment of same-sex parents.
160. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (finding that not giving full
recognition to same-sex marriages makes it “more difficult for the children to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their
community and in their daily lives”).
161. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015).
162. Id. at 2595.
163. Id. at 2606.
164. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
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“The government should be concerned not only about making sure that its
citizens are allowed to live full family lives, but that its citizens are not
deprived of lawful status and that they can exercise that citizenship
effectively.”165 By denying married same-sex parents of ART children the
right to transmit citizenship, the DOS deprives them of both a full family life
and the ability to exercise their citizenship effectively.166 It also violates their
constitutional rights recognized in the holdings and reasoning of both
Windsor and Obergefell.
B. The DOS’s Interpretation and Intent-Based Parentage
The underlying problem of the DOS’s interpretation is that it is based
purely on biology and places no weight on intention.167 While the DOS may
have narrowly expanded its definition of “biological” to include gestational
mothers, the Zaccari-Blixt case illustrates that this expansion is a feeble
attempt to cover a deeper problem.168 That the DOS now considers both
gestation and “the nationality of the sperm and egg” in determining parentage
does not change the reality that it still does not consider the intention of a
person to become a parent.169
1. Incompatibility of Biology-Based Parentage with the INA’s Purpose
“Family reunification has been the centerpiece of our legal immigration
system for decades, and it should remain so.”170 Doris Meissner, former
commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),171 made
this statement before Congress in 1995.172 Family unity has rightfully been
recognized as a staple of the U.S. immigration system because “[f]amilies are
the backbone of our country and their unity promotes the stability, health,
and productivity of family members contributing to the economic and social
welfare of the United States.”173 Without this emphasis on unity, families
would be “fractured along citizenship lines,” thereby dismantling the very
165. Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 52, at 707.
166. See id.
167. See supra Part I.B.2.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 122–32.
169. Titshaw, supra note 14, at 422.
170. Reform of Legal Immigration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 13 (1995) [hereinafter Reform Hearings] (statement of
Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (testifying that “the
reunification of U.S. citizens with their spouses and minor children [should remain] as the
Nation’s top priority for legal immigration”).
171. In 2003, “[t]he INS was abolished and its functions placed under three agencies—U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)—within the newly created Department of
Homeland Security.” Organizational Timeline, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/organizational-timeline
[https://perma.cc/53JL-Q682] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
172. See Reform Hearings, supra note 170, at 13.
173. Immigration Policy: An Overview: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 55 (2001) (statement of Karen K. Narasaki, President
and Executive Director, National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium).
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core of American society.174 Family unification has been the focus of not
only congressional testimony but also of U.S. attorneys general,175 federal
courts,176 and the Board of Immigration Appeals.177
In enacting the INA, Congress prioritized family unity. Congress designed
the INA to make it easier, not harder, for families to stay together.178 This is
evidenced in a House report commenting on the bill that later became the
original INA.179 In the report, the House Judiciary Committee found that the
proposed legislation “implements the underlying intention of our
immigration laws regarding the preservation of the family unit.”180
When Congress amended the INA for the first time in 1957, the House
Judiciary Committee produced a new report, reaffirming that the INA’s
language makes Congress’s intention to “preserve the family unit upon
immigration to the United States” clear.181 The 1957 House report also
echoed the language of a Senate Judiciary Committee report from 1952 in
finding that Congress “intended to provide for a liberal treatment of
children.”182
The 1957 House report further emphasized that, given “the clearly
expressed legislative intention to keep together the family unit wherever
possible,” it is “a desirable result . . . to adopt a liberal construction. No harm
could possibly result from such a construction, and the consequences would
fulfill the humane considerations involved in keeping intact the family
unit.”183 The current DOS interpretation is incompatible with Congress’s
clear legislative intent in enacting the INA.
2. Arbitrariness of Biology-Based Parentage in Citizenship Transmission
Massi Zaccari-Blixt was ultimately granted citizenship following an
arduous process.184 To transmit citizenship to her son, Allison had to first
174. See Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 8.
175. See, e.g., In re K-W-S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 396, 407 (Att’y Gen. 1961) (Robert F. Kennedy
stated, “our only concern is that a bona fide family unit, recognized as such under the
immigration laws, shall not be separated by strained and artificial reasoning.”).
176. See, e.g., Bastidas v. INS, 609 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding “the separation
of family members from one another . . . [to be] a serious matter requiring close and careful
scrutiny”); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (defining “stepchild”
liberally based, in part, on the “expressed congressional policy of keeping family units
together”).
177. The Board of Immigration Appeals “is the highest administrative body for interpreting
and applying immigration laws.” Board of Immigration Appeals, DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/Z7DZ-LW3V]
(last updated Oct. 15, 2018); see, e.g., In re G-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 355, 359 (B.I.A. 1959) (finding
that it is “apparent from the legislative history that Congress had in mind the family unit”).
178. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1199, at 2026 (1957) (stating that “it has been the policy of the
Congress to approve legislation designed to facilitate the reunification of families”).
179. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365 (1952).
180. Id. at 1680.
181. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1199, at 2021.
182. Id. at 2020.
183. Id. at 2021.
184. See Zaccari-Blixt Complaint, supra note 123, at 2.

1018

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

establish herself as Massi’s parent by satisfying the DOS’s requirement for a
biological relationship between parent and child.185 She then had to meet the
requisite criteria to transmit citizenship to children born out of wedlock under
section 309, which the DOS chose to apply because, even though Allison was
married to Stefania at the time of Massi’s birth, Stefania was not Massi’s
biological parent.186 Lucas Zaccari-Blixt, however, was immediately denied
birthright citizenship because Allison did not have a biological relationship
with her firstborn son.187
These nonsensical effects of the DOS’s policy are perhaps even more
evident in the two newest lawsuits to join those of the Dvash-Banks and
Zaccari-Blixt families. First is the case of the Mize-Gregg family, where the
daughter of James Derek Mize and Jonathan Gregg, Simone, was denied
citizenship even though both parents are American citizens.188 Second is the
case of the Kiviti family, where the daughter of Roee and Adiel Kiviti,
Kessem, was also denied citizenship even though, again, both parents are
American citizens.189
Both Simone and Kessem were conceived using an anonymous donor egg
and one father’s sperm, and both were born via a gestational surrogate
abroad.190 Both sets of parents were married at the time of birth.191 Yet, in
determining their citizenship status, DOS officials held that both Simone and
Kessem were born out of wedlock and accordingly applied the harsher
requirements of section 309.192 In both cases, the intended father who does
not share a biological relationship with his respective child was deemed
unable to transmit citizenship under section 309.193 So, the focus was shifted
to the fathers who could prove a biological connection—Simone’s dad,
Jonathan, and Kessem’s dad, Adiel.194
Jonathan and Adiel satisfied the criteria under section 309.195 However,
this only redirected the officials to section 301 to confirm that they also met
the physical presence requirements.196 For unclear reasons, however, the
officials applied section 301(g) in both cases, which controls when one parent
185. Id. at 13–14.
186. See id. at 14–15.
187. Id. at 3.
188. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 5, 20, Mize v. Pompeo, No. 1:19cv-3331-MLB (N.D. Ga. July 29, 2019) [hereinafter Mize-Gregg Complaint].
189. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, 13, Kiviti v. Pompeo, Civil Action
No. 19-2665 (D. Md. Sept. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Kiviti Complaint].
190. Id. at 11–12; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 16.
191. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 11; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at
15.
192. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at
20.
193. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at
20.
194. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at
20.
195. See Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188,
at 20.
196. See supra Part I.A.2.
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is an alien, instead of 301(c), which applies when both parents are citizens.197
Pursuant to section 301(g), they found that neither Jonathan nor Adiel had
satisfied the minimum five-year presence requirement that would allow them
to transmit citizenship to their daughters.198 Simone and Kessem were,
therefore, denied citizenship.199
Interestingly, Kessem was Adiel and his husband Roee’s only child to face
these hurdles.200 The couple had previously relied on a donor egg, one
father’s sperm, and a gestational surrogate to conceive their first child,
Lev.201 When they applied for Lev’s citizenship, however, the DOS official
at the time chose not to ask for biological proof between Lev and either of
his fathers and simply issued the American passport.202 Since neither the law
nor the conception method changed since Lev’s birth, it can be assumed that
the difference in treatment stems from the DOS’s unfortunate prerogative to
arbitrarily and selectively apply its policy.
The stories of the four families exemplify how, in the age of ART, a
biology-based definition of parentage leads to senseless citizenship results.
Blind reliance on biology in determining parentage leads to situations where
the person who has been raising a child with her wife for four years is not
recognized as the child’s parent;203 where one twin is granted citizenship
while the other is denied it;204 and where children are considered born out of
wedlock even though their parents are married.205
In other words, biology-based parentage prompts recognition or denial of
citizenship under the INA based on arbitrary technicalities.206 Yet, “ART is
not used accidentally.”207 These technicalities do not reflect the deliberate
efforts of intended parents who invest time, money, and emotions into ART
to have a child.208 Biology-based parentage unjustifiably ignores the fact
that “[p]arents who utilize ART do so for the singular purpose of producing
a child.”209

197. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at
25.
198. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at
20.
199. Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 13; Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at
20.
200. See Kiviti Complaint, supra note 189, at 11.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Zaccari-Blixt Complaint, supra note 123, at 12, 15–16.
204. See Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
205. See Mize-Gregg Complaint, supra note 188, at 20; Dvash-Banks Complaint, supra
note 1, at 3; Zaccari-Blixt Complaint, supra note 123, at 16–17.
206. See Craythorne, supra note 38, at 653.
207. ABA RESOLUTION 113, supra note 29, at 8.
208. See Hill, supra note 10, at 414–15 (making a “but for” causation argument by stating
that the “one essential fact favoring the moral and legal priority of the intended parents” is that
by “engineer[ing] the birth of the child,” the intended parents become the “first cause of the
procreative relationship”).
209. ABA RESOLUTION 113, supra note 29, at 8.
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3. Movement Toward Intent-Based Parentage
Acknowledging the arbitrary and discriminatory effects of the DOS’s
biology-based policy, many authorities are driving a movement toward the
acceptance of intent-based parentage in interpreting the INA’s citizenship
transmission provisions.
a. Judicial Rejection of the DOS’s Interpretation
In February 2019, the District Court for the Central District of California
found that Ethan had derived American citizenship from Andrew at birth,
even though the two do not share a biological connection.210 The court held
that Andrew and Elad are indisputably Ethan’s parents and, as such, “the only
issue is whether section 301 requires [Ethan] . . . to demonstrate a biological
relationship with both of his married parents.”211 The court proceeded to
find that section 301 does not impose such a requirement and that the DOS’s
reading to the contrary is a “strained” interpretation of the INA.212 The DOS
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.213 However, the ruling will
almost certainly be affirmed, given that the Ninth Circuit has, in the past,
explicitly rejected the DOS’s interpretation of the INA and is spearheading
the movement for recognizing intent-based parentage.214
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the INA’s citizenship
transmission provisions is based on the assumption that biology is not
necessary to establish a parent-child relationship. This is evidenced in its
two leading cases, Scales v. INS 215 and Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales,216 where
the Ninth Circuit found that the nonbiological parents transmitted citizenship
to their respective children.217 In August 2018, the Second Circuit, in Jaen
v. Sessions,218 also adopted the Ninth Circuit’s approach.219 Together, the
three cases present alternative methods to reach the same conclusion that
intent is key in determining parentage.220
Stanley Russell Scales, Jr. was born in the Philippines to his biological
Filipino mother.221 At the time of birth, his mother was married to an
210. Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 2:18-cv-00523, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30525, at *17,
*23 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-55517 (9th Cir. May 6, 2019).
211. Id. at *18.
212. Id. at *11, *18.
213. See generally Notice of Appeal, Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, No. 2:18-cv-00523, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30525 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2019).
214. See infra text accompanying notes 221–32.
215. 232 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2000).
216. 401 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005).
217. See id. at 1094; Scales, 232 F.3d at 1164.
218. 899 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2018).
219. Id. at 190.
220. While all three cases deal with opposite-sex marriages, they stand more broadly for
the Ninth and Second Circuits’ rejection of the DOS’s interpretation requiring a blood
relationship for the transmission of U.S. citizenship. The courts’ logic applies also to cases
involving same-sex marriages and ART. Titshaw, supra note 66, at 107.
221. Scales, 232 F.3d at 1161–62.
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American man who raised Scales as his own son.222 The court held that
Scales’s nonbiological American father should be considered a “parent”
under section 301 and be able to transmit citizenship to Scales.223 In reaching
its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit conducted a “straightforward reading” of
section 301 and found that “there is no requirement of a blood relationship”
to establish parentage.224 It then emphasized the difference between sections
301 and 309 by stating that section 309 “clearly was enacted, ‘at least in part,
to ensure that a person born out of wedlock who claims citizenship by birth
actually shares a blood relationship with an American citizen’”225 and that
“[i]f Congress had wanted to ensure the same about a person born in wedlock,
‘it knew how to do so.’”226
Eduardo Solis-Espinoza was born in Mexico to his biological Mexican
mother.227 However, at the time of his birth, Solis-Espinoza’s biological
Mexican father was married to Stella Cruz-Dominguez, a U.S. citizen who
raised Solis-Espinoza as her own son.228 The Ninth Circuit held that, even
though she is not biologically related to Solis-Espinoza, Cruz-Dominguez
should be considered his parent under section 301 and accordingly transmit
citizenship to Solis-Espinoza.229 The court found the result “logical” since
Cruz-Dominguez was Solis-Espinoza’s parent “[i]n every practical
sense.”230 Unlike in Scales, however, the court based its decision on
California law, the state where the family was domiciled.231 The court found
that the requirements of California law were satisfied and established CruzDominguez as Solis-Espinoza’s parent since birth under section 301.232
Finally, Levy Alberto Jaen was born in Panama to a foreign mother who
was married to Jorge Boreland, a U.S. citizen, at the time of birth.233
Although Boreland is not Jaen’s biological father, he raised Jaen as his own
son.234 The court found that Boreland was a parent under section 301 and
accordingly transmitted citizenship to Jaen.235 The court provided three
alternative ways to reach the same conclusion. First, given the INA’s silence
222. Id. at 1162.
223. Id. at 1166.
224. Id. at 1164.
225. Id. (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 435 (1998)).
226. Id. (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 492 (1994)). In a different instance
of statutory construction, the Supreme Court also found that, when “Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,
it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United
States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
227. Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005).
228. Id. at 1091–92.
229. Id. at 1094.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Id. At the time of the case, a child was “legitimate” under California law as long as
the father acknowledged the child as his own and, with the consent of his wife, received the
child into his family. Id. at 1093–94.
233. Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2018).
234. Id. at 184–85.
235. Id. at 190.
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as to the definition of “parent,” the court turned to the common law’s
“presumption of parentage based on marriage.”236 Consequently, it
concluded that, since Jaen was born during Boreland’s marriage to Jaen’s
mother, Boreland was presumed to be Jaen’s parent.237 Second, the Second
Circuit echoed the Ninth Circuit’s statutory analysis in Scales by reiterating
that “Congress clearly specified enhanced requirements [in the form of a
biological relationship] for proof of parentage in the case of children born
out of wedlock,” not for children born in wedlock.238 Finally, the court held
that Boreland would be Jaen’s parent even under relevant New York law.239
b. Rejection of the DOS’s Interpretation by Supporting Authorities
State courts and legislatures, members of Congress and the Senate, the
American Bar Association (ABA), and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)
have also endorsed the Ninth and Second Circuits’ interpretations of
parentage.
Surrogacy laws of Connecticut,240 Maine,241 Nevada,242 and New
Hampshire243 for example, recognize the legal parentage of intended parents
even when the parents do not have a genetic connection to the child.
California,244 Connecticut,245 and Vermont246 state courts, among others,
have also recognized intention as a determinative factor in parentage.
In a similar vein, nineteen Democratic senators and eighty members of the
House of Representatives have signed sharply worded letters to Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo, demanding changes to the DOS’s “discriminatory”247
and “cruel”248 interpretation of the INA. Although the letters refrain from
explicitly calling for intent-based parentage, they clearly reject the DOS’s
biology-focused approach by pointing out that “every federal court that has
236. Id. at 188.
237. See id. at 188–89. In making this analysis, the court also cited Supreme Court
precedent, which “considered ‘the historic respect—indeed, sanctity would not be too strong
a term—traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.’”
Id. at 188 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989)).
238. Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
239. Id.
240. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-48a(b) (2019).
241. See ME. STAT. tit. 19–A, §§ 1931(2), 1933 (2019).
242. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.710, 126.720 (2019).
243. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1(XIII) (2019).
244. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993); In re Marriage of Buzzanca,
72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998).
245. See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 796–97 (Conn. 2011).
246. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 970–71 (Vt. 2006) (collecting
cases).
247. Letter from Members of Congress to Michael Pompeo, Sec’y of State (June 6, 2019),
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/1099-house-democrats-letter-to-stat/ff1f3d7b524
337e92253/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/WJ4N-M2AT]; Letter from
Members of the Senate to Mike Pompeo, Sec’y of State (June 6, 2019), https://
www.merkley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Final%20letter%20LGBT%20State%20Dept.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DBQ8-5Z58].
248. Letter from Members of Congress to Michael Pompeo, supra note 247.
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addressed this issue has found that no biological requirement exists”249 and
that “Section 301 of the INA makes no requirement that either parent of a
U.S. married couple . . . must prove biological relation to their child.”250
Similarly, the ABA has issued both a resolution and position paper to
elucidate its support of intent-based parentage.251 The position paper
concludes that requiring a biological link between parent and child “is
inappropriate and violative of the privacy of intended parents.”252 The ABA
urges the DOS to interpret section 301 to recognize children born to intended
parents even in the absence of a biological relationship, as long as the parentchild relationship is recognized by the child’s country of birth.253 It further
counsels that this expanded interpretation apply retroactively.254 In the
position paper, the ABA also conducts an analysis similar to the Scales and
Jaen courts by emphasizing the silence of section 301 as to the requirement
of a biological connection.255
The ABA has codified its suggestions in two model acts—the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproduction256 (adopted January 2019) and the
supplemental Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology
Agencies257 (adopted February 2016). Both acts rely on “intended
parentage” as a basis for establishing the parent-child relationship.258
Finally, through its newest version of the Uniform Parentage Act259
(UPA), the ULC has also rejected the DOS’s policy.260 The ULC aims to
provide “states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted

249. Id.
250. Letter from Members of the Senate to Mike Pompeo, supra note 247.
251. See generally ABA RESOLUTION 113, supra note 29; AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION
WITH
REPORT NO. 112B (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/house_of_delegates/2016_hod_midyear_meeting_electronic_report_book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HT8W-KLAN] [hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION 112B]. While ABA
Resolution 112B focuses more specifically on surrogacy, its conclusions are applicable to
ART generally since the ABA recognizes that “international regulation focused solely on
surrogacy arrangements may be under-inclusive.” ABA RESOLUTION 112B, supra, at 9.
Instead of “focus[ing] on the regulation of the international surrogacy market itself,” it
suggests reaching “international agreement on the status of children and on the assignment of
parentage and citizenship to them would be more helpful in mitigating the issues in this
market.” Id.
252. ABA RESOLUTION 112B, supra note 251, at 17.
253. ABA RESOLUTION 113, supra note 29, at 9.
254. Id. at 10.
255. Id. at 3.
256. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) [hereinafter
MODEL ACT].
257. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AGENCIES (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016) [hereinafter AGENCY MODEL ACT].
258. The Model Act defines “intended parent” as “an individual who intends to be legally
bound as a Parent of the Child.” MODEL ACT § 102(26). The Agency Model Act defines it as
“an individual, married or unmarried, who manifests the intent as provided in this Act to be
legally bound as the parent of a child resulting from assisted or [c]ollaborative [r]eproduction.”
AGENCY MODEL ACT § 102(13).
259. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) [hereinafter UPA 2017].
260. See infra text accompanying notes 265–71.
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legislation.”261 It first presented the UPA, a uniform statutory scheme, in
1973 to offer comprehensive guidance in determining a child’s legal
parentage.262 A central reason behind the UPA’s 2017 revision was “to
update the Act to ensure that it applies equally to children born to same-sex
couples”263 in a way that is reflective of recently recognized constitutional
rights.264 Unlike the DOS’s policy, the UPA “has and continues to take the
position that actual parent-child bonds are important to children and that
these relationships are worthy of protection, even if the parent and the child
are not also connected by biology.”265
The 2017 UPA expands recognition of nonbiological parentage in two
ways that are particularly relevant to this Note. First, in articles 7 and 8, it
recognizes that same-sex couples, not just opposite-sex couples, can become
parents through ART.266 In fact, the 2017 UPA makes clear that its ART
provisions apply to everyone, regardless of sex, sexual orientation, or marital
status.267 It then confirms that children born through ART do not need to
have a genetic or gestational connection with their parents.268 Indeed,
articles 7 and 8 focus entirely on the parent’s conduct in establishing
parentage.269 Second, the 2017 UPA requires courts to consider a range of
factors in deciding who, of multiple claimants, should be considered a child’s
parent when genetics and conduct lead to differing results.270 In doing so,
the revised act reinforces the notion that biology does not automatically
trump intent.271
III. A DUAL APPROACH: COUNTERACTING THE EFFECTS OF THE DOS’S
POLICY ON SAME-SEX PARENTS
The current DOS practice of arbitrarily denying citizenship to the ART
children of same-sex parents is almost certainly unconstitutional under
Windsor and Obergefell.272 The policy’s fixation on biology in determining
parentage undermines the congressionally established, legitimate, and
261. Overview, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/
overview [https://perma.cc/X6Y7-VV4J] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
262. Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), YALE L.J.
FORUM 589, 597 (2018).
263. SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (2017): AN
OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/family_law/2018/
16uniformparentage.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE4F-8PER].
264. Joslin, supra note 262, at 599.
265. Id. at 600.
266. UPA 2017 arts. 7–8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); Joslin, supra note 262, at 607–08.
267. Joslin, supra note 262, at 592.
268. See UPA 2017 § 703 (“An individual who consents . . . to assisted reproduction by a
woman with the intent to be a parent of a child conceived by the assisted reproduction is a
parent of the child.”).
269. See, e.g., id.; id. § 809(a) (affirming that “on birth of a child conceived by assisted
reproduction under a gestational surrogacy agreement, each intended parent is, by operation
of law, a parent of the child”).
270. Id. § 613.
271. Joslin, supra note 262, at 605.
272. See supra Part II.A.
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important purpose that underlies the INA.273 The DOS harms family unity
by making it harder, not easier, for families like the Dvash-Bankses, ZaccariBlixts, Mize-Greggs, and Kivitis to stay together.274 In fact, the DOS “fails
spectacularly” at achieving even the government’s own goals in regulating
immigration.275
The most straightforward way of initiating change and protecting families
like the Dvash-Bankses and the Zaccari-Blixts would be for the DOS to
change its own policy. However, this seems unlikely given that the only
noteworthy change the DOS has granted was the minimal “gestation
modification” in 2014.276 The DOS is seemingly impervious to the
resistance that is building against its policy, including consequential court
decisions.
Part III accordingly presents a dual approach to counteract the effects of
the DOS’s interpretation.
First, Part III.A proposes congressional
amendment to the INA as the most efficient resolution. Second, Part III.B
suggests a collaborative approach whereby parents utilize federal courts to
assert their claims and state legislators proactively reform their parentage
laws to strengthen those claims.
A. Congressional Amendment of the INA
The DOS’s policy was born out of the lack of clarity in the INA as to what
constitutes a parent-child relationship.277 The ambiguity allowed the DOS
to intervene and interpret parent-child relationships in a “geneticessentialist”278 manner.279 The most efficient solution to the problems
caused by the DOS’s interpretation is simple: Congress must amend the INA
to provide a clear definition of “parent.” In doing so, Congress would clarify
who constitutes the parent in the parent-child relationship and, consequently,
render the DOS’s interpretation irrelevant. Simultaneously, Congress should
also consider replacing the term “blood relationship” in INA section 309 with
“parent-child relationship” to reiterate its support of intent-based parentage.
Given the increasing reliance on ART to have children,280 Congress must
make these amendments rapidly. Failure to do so will inevitably lead to an
exponential increase in same-sex couples who suffer from the effects of the
DOS’s policy.281 Congress should turn to its own history for guidance in
enacting the amendment swiftly. As originally enacted, section 1993 of the

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.2.
Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 52, at 701.
See supra text accompanying notes 111–13.
See supra Part I.B.1.
Titshaw, supra note 66, at 122.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See Titshaw, supra note 66, at 56 n.20.
See id. at 56.
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Revised Statutes of 1878282 only allowed fathers to transmit citizenship.283
Recognizing the unequal treatment faced by women, Congress amended
section 1993 to also allow mothers to transmit citizenship.284 In making the
amendment, Congress aimed to reflect the changing standards of the time.
The same reasoning applies for amending the INA to reflect the previously
unanticipated right of ART parents to transmit citizenship. Just as today it
would be unacceptable to deny women the right to transmit citizenship based
on sex, it is also unacceptable that ART parents are denied the same right due
to sexual orientation.
This impetus of Congress should be further strengthened by the fact that
Congress itself enacted the INA in a manner specifically cognizant and
protective of family unity.285 Recognizing intent-based parentage is a
straightforward solution to protecting the rights of ART families.286 It is
therefore not only in harmony with but also in furtherance of congressional
intent.
1. Requisite Amendment: Defining “Parent”
To address the underlying problem with the DOS’s interpretation,
Congress must provide a clear definition of “parent” that reflects the
nonbiological ways in which an individual can become a parent in the age of
ART. In other words, Congress must explicitly recognize intent-based
parentage. Recognition of intent-based parentage would first require the
DOS to accept the existence of a parent-child relationship between an
intended parent and their child, such as between Andrew and Ethan. Second,
it would allow a child to be considered born in wedlock as long as the child’s
intended parents were married at the time of birth, like Andrew and Elad
were. This, in turn, would require the DOS to subject same-sex parents and
their ART children to the rightful and more lenient citizenship requirements
of INA section 301, like the Dvash-Banks family should have been.

282. The Revised Statutes of the United States was a codified collection of federal laws. It
acted as the predecessor to the United States Code. Section 1993 covered citizenship and
naturalization. Andrew Winston, The Revised Statutes of the United States: Predecessor to
the U.S. Code, LIBR. CONGRESS BLOGS (July 2, 2015), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2015/07/therevised-statutes-of-the-united-states-predecessor-to-the-u-s-code/ [https://perma.cc/MT4BE3HE].
283. It stated:
All children heretofore or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens
thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship
shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States.
Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 310 (1961) (applying section 1993 to find the citizenmother married to the noncitizen could not transmit citizenship to their foreign-born child).
284. H.R. REP. NO. 3673, at 797 (1934). Today, this amendment is reflected in INA section
301(h), which recognizes that mothers, not just fathers, can transmit citizenship to children
who were born abroad prior to the congressional amendment in 1934. INA § 301(h), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(h) (2012).
285. See supra Part II.B.1.
286. See supra Part II.B.3.
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To codify these changes, it is sufficient for Congress to make a minor
addition to INA section 101(c), which provides definitions for the relevant
subchapter III of the statute.287 Currently, the only definition of “parent”
under section 101(c) is: “[t]he terms ‘parent’, ‘father’, and ‘mother’ include
in the case of a posthumous child a deceased parent, father, and mother.”288
This definition does not answer the question of how a parent is identified.
Using the 2017 UPA definition of “intended parent”289 as guidance,
Congress must add to this subsection by defining “parent” in a manner
similar to the following: “the terms ‘parent’, ‘mother’, and ‘father’ refer to
individuals who, at the time of birth, demonstrate an intent to be legally
bound as a parent of the child born naturally or through assisted reproductive
technology.”
By clarifying that the determinative factor to become a legal parent is
intent, this expanded definition of “parent” ensures that the lack of biological
connection does not destroy a parent-child relationship. Since section 301
falls under subchapter III of the INA, the DOS will be bound by this amended
definition. The new definition will have an immediate impact on section 301
since, of the section’s eight subsections, four include the term “parents”290
and one refers to both “mother” and “father.”291
2. Discretionary Amendment: Replacing the Term “Blood Relationship”
Currently, INA section 309(a)(1) requires that “a blood relationship
between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing
evidence” as the first step for fathers to transmit citizenship to their children
born out of wedlock.292 The requirement of a “blood relationship” supports
the DOS’s biology-based interpretation, although only within the context of
section 309.
To ensure sweeping application of intent-based parentage, Congress must
consider a second amendment in the form of replacing the term “blood
relationship” with “parent-child relationship.” Expanding the definition of
“parent” under section 101(c) is mandatory to eliminate ambiguity as to how
jus sanguinis citizenship is transmitted to ART children born in wedlock.293
Further amendment is not strictly necessary to protect the rights of married
same-sex parents to transmit citizenship to their children, which is the
primary focus of this Note. Nevertheless, the second discretionary
amendment is strongly encouraged for two reasons. First, it protects the
rights of same-sex parents who have chosen to have children through ART
without getting married. Second, it confirms and universalizes Congress’s
287. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c).
288. Id. § 1101(c)(2).
289. The 2017 UPA defines “intended parent” as “an individual, married or unmarried,
who manifests an intent to be legally bound as a parent of a child conceived by assisted
reproduction.” UPA 2017 § 102(13) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
290. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(e), (g).
291. Id. § 1401(h).
292. Id. § 1409(a)(1).
293. See supra Part III.A.1.
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stance regarding parentage by deliberately removing the only reference to
“blood” made in the context of jus sanguinis citizenship transmission.
If Congress chooses to enact the second amendment, it will first need to
define “parent-child relationship” under section 101(c), which currently does
not do so.294 Drawing once again from the 2017 UPA, the definition should
read similar to the following: “the term ‘parent-child relationship’ means the
legal relationship that is formed when a child is born, naturally or through
assisted reproductive technology, to an individual who, at the time of birth,
demonstrates an intent to be legally bound as a parent of the child.”
B. Collaborative Judicial Action and State Law Reform
Until Congress amends the INA, the DOS will almost certainly continue
to reject the parent-child relationship between children and their intended
same-sex parents. The parents, in turn, will have to find an alternative way
to circumvent the effects of the DOS’s policy. This alternative is available
in the form of judicial action. Courts are key players295 in counteracting the
DOS’s policy since, upon entering a courtroom, the authority to interpret the
INA shifts from the executive to the judiciary.296 As such, parents must seek
redress in courtrooms, following a trajectory similar to the four families
referenced in this Note.
In doing so, parents must rely on a twofold argument: (1) the Manual is
not a binding authority and (2) courts should abandon DOS’s biology-based
interpretation of the INA. While the first argument is based on Supreme
Court precedent, the strength of the second argument lies heavily in the
proactive reform of parentage laws by state legislatures.
1. Nonbinding Nature of the Manual
Despite the DOS’s seemingly dominating authority to interpret the INA,
the DOS’s interpretation is not, in fact, binding.297 The DOS’s policy is
codified in the Manual, which is an agency manual that was neither subjected
to notice-and-comment rulemaking nor created following formal

294. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c).
295. The role of courts in counteracting the effects of the DOS’s interpretation cannot be
understated. The Scales court, for example, opined that the government relies on the Manual
as a defense strategy because it had very few alternatives. Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1165
(9th Cir. 2000). An increased volume of judicial opinions on the subject would provide both
parties with more authority to rely on in arguing their cases. See id. The Ninth and Second
Circuit precedents are particularly significant because, by opposing the norm, they are drawing
attention to discrepancies in practice. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
part because there was a disagreement among courts that caused “impermissible geographic
variation in the meaning of federal law.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015).
296. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
297. Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 187 n.4 (2d Cir. 2018); Scales, 232 F.3d at 1166;
Cyrus D. Mehta & Sophia Genovese, The Effects of ‘America First Foreign Policy’ and ‘Buy
American Hire American’ on the Foreign Affairs Manual, 22 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1247,
1256 (2017) (“FAM does not have the force of a statute or a regulation. It is sub-regulatory
guidance and is not binding.”).
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adjudication.298 The interpretation found in the Manual therefore lacks the
force of law299 and is not entitled to deference under Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,300 which would have required a court to
give effect to what it found to be a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute.301
Instead, the Manual is subject to the weaker deference302 recognized in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.303 Under Skidmore, the Manual is not “controlling
upon the courts by reason of [its] authority.”304 Instead, the Manual is
“entitled to respect” only if it has the “power to persuade.”305 Based on the
discussion in Part II, parents have a very strong argument that the Manual is
not persuasive and therefore does not have a binding effect.306 That being
the case, reliance on the judiciary is critical for parents because it provides
them with an opportunity to argue their case before an authority that is not
bound by the DOS’s interpretation.
2. State Parentage Law as a Guide to Alternative Interpretation of the INA
Federal courts often rely on state laws in interpreting ambiguous federal
statutory language.307 In the context of the INA, this often includes
interpreting ambiguous domestic relations terms, as illustrated by the courts

298. Scales, 232 F.3d at 1166; Titshaw, supra note 66, at 102–03.
299. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that the
interpretation found in an agency opinion letter issued without formal adjudication or noticeand-comment rulemaking lacks the force of law, much like interpretations contained in similar
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines); see also Moore v. Apfel,
216 F.3d 864, 869 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to give Chevron deference to the Social
Security Administration’s internal agency manual).
300. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
301. See id. at 842–44. This Note holds that even if Chevron were applicable, Chevron
deference would still not be granted since the DOS’s interpretation of the INA is not
reasonable, as argued in Part II.
302. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (holding that the interpretation found in an agency
opinion letter issued without formal adjudication or notice-and-comment is entitled to only
Skidmore deference).
303. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
304. See id. at 140.
305. Id.
306. See supra Part II; see also Higdon, supra note 42, at 155 (arguing that “[g]iven then
the way in which Congress crafted the statutes at issue, for the State Department to define ‘out
of wedlock’ in a way that contravenes the ordinary meaning of the phrase is both unreasonable
and impermissible”).
307. See, e.g., Huyen V. Nguyen v. Holder, 743 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 2014) (relying on
New York law to define incest); Garcia v. USICE (Dep’t of Homeland Sec.), 669 F.3d 91, 95
(2d Cir. 2011) (relying on New York law to define legal custody); Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d
415, 423–24, 426 (5th Cir. 2001) (relying on Alabama, Delaware, Minnesota, and Nebraska
state laws to define legal separation); Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that while terms in a federal statute must take their meaning from federal law, federal
law can look to state law, or even foreign law, for a rule of decision); Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d
432, 436 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that federal courts can turn to state law in defining good
moral character for naturalization purposes).
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of Scales,308 Solis-Espinoza,309 and Jaen.310 For this reason, state
legislatures play a crucial role in strengthening parents’ second argument that
courts should abandon the DOS’s biology-based interpretation of parentage
in favor of an intent-based reading. By proactively adopting laws that
recognize intent-based parentage, state legislatures can provide courts with
guidance as to an alternative way to interpret the INA.311
Efforts are already underway to help state legislatures achieve this goal.312
The 2017 UPA is a prime example. As discussed in Part II.B, the 2017 UPA
definition of parentage stands in stark contrast to the DOS’s interpretation.
Unlike the DOS, the 2017 UPA considers intent, not biology, to be
Courts
determinative in establishing a parent-child relationship.313
interpreting the ambiguous parentage requirements of INA sections 301 and
309 pursuant to the 2017 UPA will inevitably find that a parent-child
relationship exists between same-sex parents and their foreign-born ART
children, even if they lack a biological connection.314
To enable courts to reach this conclusion, state legislatures must adopt the
2017 UPA, or a version of it.315 Parents, in turn, must rely on the UPAinspired state parentage laws while constructing their arguments. In doing
so, they should rely not only on UPA articles 7 and 8, which directly address
intended ART parents,316 but also on UPA section 613, which provides
specific factors to consider in determining parentage.317 These factors
include “the length of time during which each individual assumed the role of

308. Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to Washington state
law’s presumption of parentage based on marriage).
309. Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005) (relying on
California state law to determine whether a parent-child relationship exists).
310. Jaen v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 182, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that New York state
law could be considered in determining parentage).
311. See Joslin, supra note 262, at 591 (arguing that “legislatures are well situated to
proactively reform their parentage statutes to address these sex- and sexual-orientation-based
distinctions”).
312. Id.
313. See supra notes 262–71 and accompanying text.
314. See supra text accompanying note 268.
315. Currently, the 2017 UPA has been enacted by three states: California, Vermont, and
Washington. Parentage Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, https://my.uniformlaws.org/
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f
[https://perma.cc/NC42-RJ2W] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). It is not a coincidence that either
the Ninth or the Second Circuit has jurisdiction over these states. See About U.S. Federal
Courts, FED. B. ASS’N, http://www.fedbar.org/Public-Messaging/About-US-FederalCourts_1.aspx [https://perma.cc/P2BJ-8WTV] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). History indicates
that states will continue to adopt at least a version of the 2017 UPA. When the first version
of the UPA was presented in 1973, its provisions seeking to eliminate the status of
“illegitimate” children seemed a drastic change. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2002). However, the 1973 UPA was nevertheless promulgated, in part due to
recent Supreme Court decisions of the time, which invalidated laws disadvantaging
illegitimate children. Id. Today, Windsor, Obergefell, and Pavan provide the same impetus
to states who may find intent-based parentage to be a substantial amendment to their laws.
316. UPA 2017 arts. 7–8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
317. Id. § 613.
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parent of the child,”318 “the nature of the relationship between the child and
each individual,”319 and “the harm to the child if the relationship between the
child and each individual is not recognized.”320
Such collaboration between plaintiffs, federal courts, and state legislatures
may protect same-sex families and their ART children by allowing courts to
circumvent the effects of the DOS’s interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Developments in ART have shattered preconceptions of what an “average”
American family looks like. ART has also given same-sex couples an
alternative to adoption in expanding their families. Indeed, today many
same-sex parents like the Dvash-Bankses, Zaccari-Blixts, Mize-Greggs, and
Kivitis are the proud parents of ART children. However, the same families
are suffering due to the DOS’s interpretation of the INA.
Pursuant to the DOS’s interpretation, U.S. citizen parents can convey
citizenship to their ART child only if they can establish a biological
connection with the child. This is often difficult for same-sex ART parents,
at least one of whom will always lack a biological connection with their child.
Further, even if the U.S. citizen parent can accomplish this first step, they
must additionally satisfy the strict citizenship requirements of INA section
309, which governs children born out of wedlock. This is because, with one
narrow exception, the DOS considers ART children of all married same-sex
couples as categorically born out of wedlock.
The DOS’s biology-based interpretation of parentage is constitutionally
suspect under the recent Supreme Court decisions of Obergefell, Windsor,
and Pavan. The manner in which the DOS utterly disregards intent to
become a parent in its interpretation is also unjustifiable. In order to protect
same-sex parents and their ART children, change is necessary. While the
most efficient solution is for Congress to amend the INA in recognition of
intent-based parentage, it is also crucial for federal courts and state
legislatures to collaborate to strengthen the claims of parents. It is only by
doing so that the “new average” American family can be protected.

318. Id. § 613(a)(2).
319. Id. § 613(a)(3).
320. Id. § 613(a)(4).

